Terminology

"Paper Ballot"

A paper record of a voter's choices that is used for the original vote count.

"Paper Receipt"

A paper record of a voter's choices that is used, if at all, only for a vote recount.

· Often denoted only generically, as "paper trail."

· Often conflated with "paper ballot."

"Paper Trail"

Refers collectively to both "paper ballots" and "paper receipts."

Also refers to paper records that have less value for a vote audit.

For example, printouts of vote totals.

Properly, both "paper ballots" and "paper receipts" are voter-verified documents.

Advantages: Paper Ballot vs. Paper Receipt

Paper Ballot

Paper Receipt

The sole authoritative record of the voter's

choices.

Of uncertain authority: In one court case, the judge disqualified the paper receipts.

A true ballot: Serves as the original source for the vote count and for any recounts.

Not a true ballot: Does not serve as the source for a vote count unless and until a recount occurs. But recounts are unlikely:

· Most elections are not deemed "close" enough to merit a recount.

· Recounts are troublesome and costly.

· Judges can deny a recount even when a recount is warranted.

· Recounts are likely to be stonewalled once the nominal winner takes office.

Printed on durable paper or card stock.

Printed on a slip of thin paper, much like a cash register receipt.

Reviewed carefully by the voter, who is aware it will be used for the vote counting.

May be ignored or only skimmed, much like the cash-register receipt it resembles.

(One study found only 10% get reviewed.)

Easily examined and verified by the voter.

Usually observable only behind protective glass, and difficult or impossible to handle.

If the ballot gets damaged, the voter is savvy enough to ask for a replacement.

If damaged, will be ignored, if the voter believes the "real" vote is in the machine.

When deposited, is tangible proof that the votes have been properly cast.

When printed, is not proof that the votes have been properly cast by the machine.

Easy to handle during recounts.

Fragile, difficult to handle during recounts.

Misconceptions

1. A voter-verified paper ballot can employ barcodes to speed the counting.

Response: Such a ballot does not qualify as "voter verified": The voter cannot verify that the barcodes are correct.

2. Paper receipts serve as a deterrent to ballot tampering.

Response: Paper receipts have little deterent value, since county-wide audits are rare, and audits of sample precincts can't guarantee the accuracy of unaudited precincts.

Even if ballot tampering is detected, uncovering the perpetrator is sure to be difficult or impossible. This further undermines any deterrent effect.

3. We can choose to employ paper ballots, or digital voting, but not both.

Response: Paper ballots and digital voting are compatible, and even synergistic.

A touch-screen system can help the voter prepare a ballot that is free of overvotes, undervotes, confused markings, and illegible write-ins.

When satisfied with the on-screen image of the ballot, the voter can generate the printed ballot, verify it, and deposit it by hand into the ballot box.

The official vote count can be derived from tallying the printed ballots. Meanwhile, the voting machine's tally is treated as only an estimate–respectable, but unofficial.

This strategy prevents voting-machine malfunctions from affecting the official count. [ ]